Thirteen technologies that can be aimed at a person without their agreement — what each does, how you would know, and what helps.
Ordered by consequence, not by how alarming the name sounds: physical safety first, then money and legal exposure, then privacy. Reviewed 20 October 2026.
What it can do. A tag the size of a coin reports its position to any phone that passes within range, so its owner can watch where the bag, coat, pram or car goes. It never pairs with your phone and asks you nothing.
How you would know. An iPhone warns you about an unknown tag travelling with you, and Android has “Unknown tracker alerts”. A Bluetooth scanner app will show a tag that keeps reappearing in the same place. In a car they are usually taped under a bumper, behind a boot panel or under a seat.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Real The one overstated version is the story that they can listen through it — these are locator beacons, not microphones.
What it can do. A few seconds of audio — a voicemail, a podcast, a wedding video — is enough to produce a convincing fake of someone you trust asking for money, a code, or a password reset.
How you would know. The tell is rarely the audio. It is urgency, secrecy, a changed bank account, a request to keep it quiet, or a push to move to a different channel mid-conversation.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Real The defence is old-fashioned: two channels and a callback beat any AI-voice detector.
What it can do. A cheap app turns an ordinary photograph into sexual imagery of a real person who never agreed to any of it, and the output spreads on the platforms people already use every day.
How you would know. Reverse image search, a sudden wave of strange accounts, or someone telling you. There is no reliable detector; the platforms’ own reporting tools are the practical route.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Real “It’s only pictures, nobody gets hurt” is the claim to reject — the harm is the distribution and the permanence.
What it can do. Your agreement is not required. A second cousin’s upload is enough for matching to find relatives, and a distant match is what lets police build a family tree towards a suspect.
How you would know. You cannot detect it. The only signal is a relative mentioning a test, or a match notification you were not expecting.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Real Underrated: people worry about their own data leaking, when the mechanism that actually identifies people is other people’s kits.
What it can do. A camera at an entrance compares your face against a watchlist — often people banned from the venue, sometimes “known offenders”. Some systems also estimate age or mood.
How you would know. Cameras at eye height on the door, signage, staff with a tablet. Ask in writing whether the venue uses live facial recognition, and against which list.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Contested “They store everyone’s face” is usually wrong — most systems match against a list and discard non-matches. “It doesn’t make mistakes” is equally wrong, and the error rate is not spread evenly across faces.
What it can do. Software scores voice stress on a call, facial movement on a video interview, or the rhythm of your typing, and calls the output engagement, honesty or leadership potential.
How you would know. An interview or assessment that asks for recorded video answers, or a call platform with a “sentiment” tile. Ask which vendor it is and what the score is used for.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Contested The software runs, but reading emotion from a face or a voice is not reliable, and the research consensus has been against it since 2019. Treat a score as an opinion about you, not a measurement.
What it can do. Employer software logs keystrokes, screenshots, application use and location, and sometimes webcam stills. Some of it is set out in a policy; some is covert and justified afterwards.
How you would know. A device-management profile on your phone, a “productivity” score in a dashboard, IT asking you to install an agent, or a policy update nobody read.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Contested “They can read your personal WhatsApp on a work phone” is true only where the policy says so and it survives a necessity test. Read the policy before believing either side.
What it can do. A modern car records location history, speed and braking, syncs contacts and messages from your phone, and shares data with the manufacturer’s partners. Insurance dongles and dashcams add another layer.
How you would know. The car’s own privacy menu, the companion app’s data-sharing switches, and any dongle plugged into the diagnostic port.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Real Mozilla’s Privacy Not Included review of car brands found every one it tested failed its minimum privacy standard. What it does not support is the claim that the car is listening to your conversations — unless it has a microphone and you have seen it in the settings.
What it can do. Remote exam software films you, scans your room, watches where you look and listens for voices. A school-issued laptop can be managed down to the applications and the camera.
How you would know. The pre-exam room scan, a locked browser, an administrator profile on a school device, or a monitoring clause in the acceptable-use policy.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Contested A flag is not proof. Gaze and audio alerts are reviewed by a human and are wrong often enough that several universities dropped the software after complaints.
What it can do. Companies merge public records, loyalty schemes and old breach data into a profile: address history, phone numbers, relatives, inferred income, sometimes a “risk score”.
How you would know. Search your own name and postcode in a private window, then the same with your phone number. The profiles surface quickly.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Overstated Understated one way and overstated the other — brokers rarely hold your bank details, but they nearly always hold your old addresses and your family.
What it can do. Speakers and doorbells keep a short audio buffer in memory to catch their wake word, then send the request away to be transcribed. Misactivations happen: the device thought it heard its name.
How you would know. Every major assistant keeps a voice history you can open in its app, and a hardware mute button cuts the microphone at the circuit rather than in software.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Overstated “It records everything you say” is not how it works — it buffers locally and uploads only after a wake word, though false wakes do send short clips.
What it can do. A meter reading every half hour says more than what you owe: when the house is occupied, when you sleep, when you are away. Research can pull appliance-level signals out of the load curve; that last step is not a consumer product yet.
How you would know. Your supplier’s app or data page shows what is collected and how often. Look for the half-hourly or monthly setting and the list of third parties receiving it.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Overstated The appliance-by-appliance version describes a capability that exists in papers, not on a bill. Occupancy inference, though, is real.
What it can do. Sensors in a shop or station listen for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals to estimate footfall, dwell time and repeat visits, without anyone connecting to anything.
How you would know. You cannot, and that is the point — it is passive. Small signs at the entrance are the usual notice, and they are often out of date.
Consent.
What helps
Claim check. Overstated This was a genuine privacy story in 2014, and hardware-address randomisation has removed most of the bite. It stays on the list because the signage has not caught up.
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The four labels. Deployed means it is on sale and in ordinary use now. Emerging means the capability exists but is niche, pilot-stage, or only partly shipped. Contested means the technology is real and the evidence for what it claims is not settled — either legally or scientifically. Overstated means the scary version of the story has outrun the technology, and the entry exists so you can say why.
What “consent” means here. It is not a legal test and it is not the same as a tick-box. It is the practical question: could you have said no and still lived your life? “Buried” means a term you agreed to without reading, at a moment when refusing was not realistic. “Notice” means a sign you walked past. “Coerced” means the alternative was losing a job, a course or a home.
Why there are no live headlines. A feed would be more exciting and much less useful: it would rot within a week and it would arrive with somebody else’s framing attached. These entries are deliberately slow — the capability, the evidence trail and the questions that work. The review date above is the honest expiry date. Where the law has moved quickly (intimate deepfakes, emotion recognition) the entry says so and tells you to check current guidance rather than quoting a statute that may since have changed.
What it will not do. It will not tell you that you are being watched, identify a product from a photograph, name a company as a wrongdoer, or help anyone deploy any of this. It is a map of the terrain and a list of things to ask for, written from the side of the person on the receiving end.
Jurisdiction and limits. Written from the UK — subject access requests, the ICO, Report Remove and the Revenge Porn Helpline are UK routes, and the EU note is flagged where it applies. Laws and products both change; the actions that hold up across borders are the ones about asking in writing, keeping records and verifying through a second channel. This is general information, not legal advice.
Last reviewed: 2026-10-20. No network requests, no accounts, nothing you type leaves the page.